

Suricata

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July 7, 2014

OISF

- 'founder' and lead developer of Suricata IDS/IPS

Open Source


- Vuurmuur - firewall manager
- ModSecurity, libhttp, modsec2sguil, sguil, snort_inline

Contact

- @inliniac
- <http://blog.inliniac.net/>

Open Information Security Foundation

- <http://www.openinfosecfoundation.org>
- Non-profit foundation organized to build a next generation IDS/IPS engine
- Funded by US Government (DHS, Navy)
- Development of an Open Source IDS/IPS: Suricata



- Consortium members
 - Platinum level: Lockheed Martin, nPulse Technologies
 - Gold level: Tiler, Altera, Endace, Emerging Threats
 - Bronze level: Everis, Myricom, Emulex
 - Technology partner: Napatech, Nvidia
- Developers
 - Victor Julien
 - Anoop Saldanha, Eric Leblond
 - various developers from consortium members
 - lots of community contributions
- Board
 - Matt Jonkmann
 - Richard Bejtlich, Dr. Jose Nazario, Ken Steele, Randy Caldejon, Luca Deri, Alexandre Dulaunoy

- Bring new technologies to IDS
- Give room to experimentation
- Performance
 - Multi-threading
 - Hardware acceleration
- Open source
- Support of Linux / *BSD / Mac OSX / Windows

Bro

- Different technology (capture oriented)
- Script based inspection and detection

Snort

- Equivalent
- Compatible
- Competing

Suricata

- Driven by a foundation, community
- Multi-threaded
- Native IPS
- Advanced functions (flowint, libHTTP, lua)
- PF_RING support, CUDA support
- Modern and modular code
- Dynamic fast moving project

Snort

- Developed by Cisco/Sourcefire
- Multi-process
- IPS support
- SO ruleset (advanced logic + perf but closed)
- No hardware acceleration
- Old code

- IPv6, IPS
- Multi-threaded
- Native hardware acceleration (PF_RING, Napatech, Endace, Tiler)
- IP lists, IP reputation, GeoIP
- Protocol detection
- Protocol Logging
- JSON output (logstash, splunk)
- Snort compatible rules
- Snort compatible output (unified2/barnyard2)
- Many more: <http://suricata-ids.org/features/all-features/>

Suricata with ELK

ELK: elastic search, logstash, kibana.



Intrusion Detection System

An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a device or software application that monitors network or system activities for malicious activities or policy violations and produces reports to a Management Station. (source: Wikipedia)

Intrusion Prevention System

Intrusion prevention systems (IPS), also known as intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS), are network security appliances that monitor network and/or system activities for malicious activity. (source: Wikipedia)

- Positioned *inline*, as it needs to be able to block packets
- Can be done via routing or bridging
- Active response also possible, but less reliable
- Good fit for Netfilter

3 Suricata IPS modes

Netfilter

- Use libnetfilter_queue and NFQUEUE
- Verdict packet redirected by iptables rules

ipfw

- Uses divert socket
- Dedicated filtering rules must be added
- Supports FreeBSD and OS X

AF_PACKET

- Using Linux capture
- Transmit packets we allow, drop others
- Ethernet transparent mode

The transformation

- Make some rules start with *drop* instead of *alert*
- A selection must be made – not all rules suitable for dropping

Tool usage

- Rules are updated
- Tool are needed to make changes persistent
- **Pulledpork**: <http://code.google.com/p/pulledpork/>
- **oinkmaster**: <http://oinkmaster.sourceforge.net/>

Using a Linux/Netfilter based IPS

- Use NFQUEUE to send decision to userspace
- All packets of a connection must be seen to Suricata
- The brutal way: iptables -A FORWARD -j NFQUEUE

Interaction with the firewall

- NFQUEUE is a terminating target
 - An ACCEPT decision will shortcut the whole ruleset
 - This is the only possible decision but DROP
- The previous method is thus incompatible with the existence of a ruleset.

Why not IPS

- Sometimes mixing IDS and IPS is needed
- Blocking not acceptable and/or latency not acceptable
- False positive risk too high
- Detection and logging still required

Alternative

- We could use general IDS mode (-i eth0 / --af-packet=eth0)
- But that could lead to duplicate inspection when already using IPS
- Pcap capture method sees packets before iptables, so also packets that will be dropped
- Solution: NFLOG support

Suricata NFLOG support brought to you by:



Giuseppe Longo – @glongo01

- NFLOG / libnetfilter_log sends packets to user space apps
- Like NFQUEUE, but non-terminating and no verdict
- Suricata support created by Giuseppe Longo
- <http://blog.lupiaae.org/capture-packets-from-nflog-in-suricata/>

- Brute force: `iptables -A FORWARD -j NFLOG`

- Mixing with NFQUEUE is possible
- `iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -j NFQUEUE`
- `iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -j NFLOG`
- Currently 2 Suricata instances needed

IDS

- iptables -A FORWARD -j NFLOG --nflog-group 7
- suricata --nflog=7

IPS

- iptables -A FORWARD -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 10
- suricata -q 10

Making things easy

- Create custom 'IDS' target
- iptables -N IDS
- iptables -A IDS -j NFLOG --nflog-group 7
- iptables -A IDS -j ACCEPT

Using the new target in rules

- iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -j IDS
- suricata --nflog=7

Future Work

- Benchmarking
- Suricata 'mixed mode' IDS and IPS: `suricata -q 10 -nflog=7`
- NIC offloading?